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Abstract: 
The federal Empowerment Zone (EZ) program is a set of tax incentives targeted to areas of 
select cities.  I estimate the effect of the EZ program on employment, poverty, and property 
values by comparing areas that received an EZ to areas that applied (and qualified), but 
were rejected.  Because of endogeneity concerns, I use political representation to 
instrument for EZ designation. OLS results show a positive and statistically significant 
effect of the program on employment and poverty.  IV estimates suggest the program had 
no effect on employment and poverty, and instead had a large statistically significant effect 
on property values. 
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I. Introduction 
Geographically-targeted tax incentives are an increasingly popular policy for economic 
redevelopment.  The first federal tax incentive with a geographic targeting mechanism, the 
Empowerment Zone (EZ) program, began in 1995 as the start of a decade-long trend toward 
using the federal tax code to subsidize areas experiencing economic hardship.  In addition to the 
nine original EZs, Congress established 29 new zones since 1997.  The Office of Management 
and Budget estimates that in terms of foregone revenue, geographically-targeted tax incentives 
will cost1 $1.7 billion in fiscal year 2009 and $4.8 billion for 2009-2013 (Executive Office of the 
President, 2008).2  Despite the growing popularity of geographically-based tax incentives among 
policy makers, there is not a consensus about how they affect targeted populations.   
  I use the federal EZ program to test the effect of geographically-based tax incentives on local 
employment, resident poverty rates, and median property values.  Previous estimates of the 
federal EZ program, Busso and Kline (2006) and HUD (2001), find large positive effects on 
employment and large negative effects on poverty rates; however both of these studies treat EZ 
assignment as strictly exogenous.  Krupka and Noonan (2009) estimate a substantial positive 
effect of the federal EZ program on local property values, a result that is robust to several 
specifications, some that account for endogeneity of zone assignment.  I examine potential for 
zone designation to be endogenous to outcomes of interest and use instrumental variables to 
provide estimates that correct for the potential endogeneity bias.     
                                                 
1 Estimate includes expenditures on Empowerment Zones, Renewal Communities, Enterprise Communities, the 
New York Liberty Zone that was established in the wake of 9/11, the Gulf Opportunity Zone established after 
Hurricane Katrina, and the District of Columbia Enterprise Zone. 
2 2009-2012 estimates assume that many of the Empowerment Zones will be allowed to expire at the end of 2009 
making this an underestimate.  Despite this caveat, these tax incentives are larger than over half of all tax 
expenditures in the budget for the period in terms of forgone revenue. 
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I estimate the effect of the EZ program with two different methods.  The first, an OLS 
differencing design, compares the relative outcomes for EZ designated areas and their 
surrounding city with rejected applicants and their surrounding city before and after the program.  
The primary assumption in the first method is that EZ designation is not correlated with expected 
changes in economic outcomes of interest.  The second, an IV approach, uses federal political 
representation of local jurisdictions as an instrument for EZ designation.  The primary 
assumption in the second method is that political representation prior to EZ designation is not 
correlated with changes in economic outcomes of interest. 
The OLS results suggest that the EZ program has a positive and statistically significant effect 
on resident employment rates, and a negative and statistically significant effect on resident 
poverty rates.  IV results suggest that the EZ program has no effect on resident employment 
(point estimates equal to zero), and a positive effect on resident poverty rates; however both of 
these results are statistically imprecise.  Alternatively, IV estimates show a large, positive and 
statistically significant effect of the program on median property values. 
The remainder of the paper begins with a brief description of the previous literature.  Section 
III follows with an explanation of the EZ program and outlines my identification strategy.  
Section IV gives a summary of the demographic and economic characteristics of both the EZs 
and comparison areas, before and after designation.  In Section V, I describe my results using 
both OLS and instrumental variables regressions.  Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Previous Studies of Geographically-Targeted Tax Incentives 
Policy makers at all levels of government have implemented a myriad of geographically-
targeted tax incentive programs during the last few decades.  The incentives offered differ across 
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jurisdictions; some offer tax credits for hiring or training employees in certain industries, others 
offer tax credits related to creating jobs, many offer incentives for capital investment.  The 
common theme of these incentives is that they create differential tax treatment within an 
otherwise homogenous tax jurisdiction3 that is based on a precise physical location within that 
jurisdiction.   
The majority of past analyses of geographically-targeted tax incentives study programs 
initiated at the state level, and focuses on how these programs affect employment outcomes.  
Papke (1994) examined the State of Indiana Enterprise Zone program that gives both capital and 
labor tax incentives to firms operating within the zone.  She finds that unemployment claims at 
offices within the zone declined by 19 percent, a decline of 1,500 claims per year at the mean.  
Boarnet and Bogart (1996) examine the effect of the New Jersey Enterprise Zone program and 
find that Enterprise Zone status had no effect on employment or property values at the municipal 
level.  O’Keefe (2004) finds that the Enterprise Zone program in California increased 
employment growth by 3.1 percent relative to comparison areas in the first 6 years followed by a 
decrease in employment growth of 3.2 percent in years 7 to 13. 
Bondonio and Engberg (2000) analyze a set of different state geographically-targeted 
incentives and find that they have no impact on employment.  The null result is robust to 
different methodology and is not sensitive to the features of state programs or the value of the 
incentives offered.  Bondonio and Greenbaum (2007) also analyze different state geographically-
targeted programs, but look for differential impacts by the status of firm.  They find that 
geographically-targeted incentives have a positive effect on employment at new and existing 
firms, but these gains are offset by the loss at firms that close or leave the area.    
                                                 
3 For instance, if all residents of a county normally faced the same tax treatment, these policies would create areas 
based on geography within the county that receive different tax treatment. 
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There are three evaluations of the federal EZ, one conducted by the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) in 2001, another by Busso and Kline (2006) and a more recent 
analysis by Krupka and Noonan (2009).  The HUD study finds several positive effects on areas 
that received EZ designation including: growth at firms located within the EZs, an increase in the 
number of residents employed at firms located within the EZs, and an increase in the number of 
resident-owned businesses.   The HUD study identifies the effect of EZs by comparing 
employment at firms located in the EZs to firms in areas of the city that are both similar and 
adjacent to the EZs before and after zone designation.   
Busso and Kline (2006) use rejected applicants as a comparison group to identify the effects 
of EZs using a difference-in-difference methodology.  The preferred estimates of Busso and 
Kline suggest that EZ designation is associated with a statistically significant 4.1 percentage 
point increase in local employment, and a 3.8 percentage point decrease in local poverty rates. 
Both the HUD and Busso and Kline estimation strategies rely on the assumption that EZ 
designation did not depend on the economic outcomes that an area would have experienced had 
it not been awarded EZ status (i.e. that EZ designation is exogenous).  
Krupka and Noonan (2009) use future recipients of EZs as a control group to determine the 
effects of first round EZs on local property values.4  They address endogeneity concerns by 
applying the instrumental variables strategy developed in an earlier version of this paper.  They 
find that the EZ program is responsible for a substantial increase in median property value in 
designated areas.  The increase in property value is robust across specifications that account for 
endogeneity with the magnitude of these estimates ranging from a low of twenty percent to a 
                                                 
4 They do not use a direct comparison strategy as presented here, but instead include data on all census block groups 
and create separate dummy variables for round 1 EZs and all areas that ever had an EZ.  This estimation strategy 
may suffer from multicollinearity as the round 1 EZ variable is equal to one only when the EZ ever variable is also 
equal to one.  It may also suffer from bias if the initial EZ application process was beneficial to areas.  
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high of sixty percent.  They find positive and significant effects even without accounting for 
endogeneity, which, when compared to the results using rejected applicants here suggests that 
there may be important unobserved characteristics of areas that went through the original 
application process. 
In addition to the growing literature on Zones, there is a related literature that assesses tax 
increment financing (TIF) areas.  The TIF concept is similar to the Zone concept in that a 
geographic area is set aside for special treatment within a jurisdiction; however, instead of being 
offered direct assistance, TIF areas are granted claim to any increase in property tax collection 
that results from increased property values in the designated area.  The evaluation of TIFs is 
plagued by similar problems as the evaluation of Zones.  As pointed out by Dye and Merriman 
(2000), identifying the effects of a TIF are especially challenging due to the fact that the value of 
the TIF is directly related to the growth in property values.  Dye and Merriman summarize this 
problem with the following question: “does TIF adoption cause future growth in property values 
or does anticipated growth in property values cause the decision to adopt tax increment 
financing”? 
Despite the challenges in identifying the effects of TIFs empirically, researchers have had 
some success.  Dye and Merriman (2000) estimate the effects of TIF adoption using a self-
selection treatment model to account for the endogenous designation of TIF areas.  Using data 
from the Chicago area, they find cities that adopt TIF districts have slower property value growth 
than those that do not adopt TIFs.  Anderson (1990) also recognizes the simultaneous nature of 
TIF adoption and property value growth in estimating the effects of TIFs on property values in 
Michigan, and estimates the effect of TIF adoption using a two-stage estimation strategy with 
structural Probit model.  Anderson finds that cities with a growing population and higher 
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predicted property values are more likely to adopt TIFs, suggesting that indeed simultaneity is a 
problem.  Anderson comes to the opposite conclusion of Dye and Merriman about the property 
value impact of TIFs, he finds that cities that adopt TIFs have greater property value increases 
than those that do not adopt.      
Part of the explanation in these contradictory findings may come from both the wide 
variation in the type of TIFs and the substantial spill-over effects that TIF districts have on 
surrounding property values in a city.  Weber, Bhatta, and Merriman (2007) find that properties 
in Chicago located near industrially zoned TIFs experienced declines in value, while those 
located near commercially and residentially zoned TIFs experienced an increase in property 
values.  See Weber, Bhatta, and Merriman (2007) for a recent, more complete review of the 
literature on TIFs. 
         
III. Program Details and OLS Identification Strategy 
The federal government began to offer tax incentives to employers located in parts of 
economically distressed areas with the creation of the Empowerment Zone program,5 which was 
passed into law as part of the 1993 Budget Reconciliation (OBRA 1993, P.L. 103-66).  HUD 
designated 6 EZs in urban areas; the Department of Agriculture designated 3 EZs in rural areas.  
EZs were chosen from a group of applications made by state and local governments.  Each 
department considered applications for areas where at least 20 percent of the population lived in 
poverty and 6.3 percent were unemployed (GAO, 2004).  From 78 nominees (Wallace, 2004), 
the federal government awarded EZ status to parts of 6 cities (Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, 
                                                 
5 Given (2004) lists Alaska, Delaware, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, New Hampshire, Nevada, North Dakota, South 
Dakota, and Wyoming as the only states that do not have some sort of zone-based tax incentive program. 
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Detroit, Philadelphia/Camden, New York) and 3 rural areas (Kentucky Highlands, Mississippi 
Delta, and the Rio Grande Valley in Texas).  Zones were established at the census tract level. 
The EZ program is primarily a set of tax incentives claimed by employers who operate inside 
of well-defined geographic boundaries and hire residents of those areas, each tax incentive is 
explained in detail in the appendix.  For the original urban EZs, $100 million in the form of 
Social Service Block Grant funds accompanied the tax incentives.6   The largest component of 
the EZ program is the wage tax credit,7 which allows employers operating in the zone that hire 
residents of the zone to claim up to a $3,000 tax credit per employee.  Many of the nominees that 
did not receive EZ status were given a “runner-up” award called Enterprise Communities (EC) a 
less generous overall package of assistance with a limited set of tax incentives.8  The tax 
incentives and grant allocations for each type of designation are detailed in Table 1. 
Because the nominees that were not awarded EZ status were still granted some location-
specific benefits, HUD maintained detailed boundary files at the census tract level for each city.  
I use a list of the census tracts for all zones obtained through personal correspondence with HUD 
administrators to define precise comparison and treatment areas.  Key for my identification 
strategy, only the original EZs were allowed to claim the wage tax credit during the years of data 
that I use (1990-2000).  Although my comparison and treatment groups differ primarily by the 
                                                 
6 Social Service Block Grants can be used for a variety of services including: day care for children, employment 
services, counseling, legal services, transportation, education, and substance abuse recovery.  Grant funds for each 
EZ are funded through the department of Health and Human Services and administered by states.  $40 million in 
Social Service Block Grants was awarded to rural EZs. 
7 According to the U.S Government Accountability Office (1999), the wage tax credit is the most-used tax incentive 
by zone businesses; the IRS does not report claims for any of the other zone-related incentives besides the zone 
facility bonds (see Hanson, 2006 for a discussion of the EZ wage tax credit use). 
8 The Boston, Oakland, Houston and Kansas City nominees were designated as Enhanced Enterprise Communities 
(EEC).  EEC status gave these communities a more generous allocation of grant funds than the standard Enterprise 
Communities.  Two nominees, Cleveland and Los Angeles, were awarded the status of Supplemental Empowerment 
Zone (SEZ) (GAO, 2004), which did not allow for all of the tax benefits of regular EZs, but included more generous 
grants than regular EZs.  All of the results presented in this paper are robust to excluding the Cleveland and Los 
Angeles runner-up areas from the control group.   
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availability of the wage tax credit, the treatment cities also received a larger one-time grant 
allocation than most of the control cities.  Because I cannot separate the effect of the one-time 
grant from the wage tax credit, my results should be viewed as the joint effect of the grant and 
continued presence of the wage tax credit. 
I use the census tracts for all “runner-up” designations9 as a comparison group because they 
were not allowed to claim the wage tax credit.  To facilitate clean identification I use a triple-
difference method to identify the effects of the EZ program.  This strategy compares the 
outcomes for census tracts awarded an EZ with those that were not, both across time and with the 
city average.  Figure 1 shows a map of the New York City EZ and the runner-up Los Angeles EC 
to demonstrate the triple-difference method. As an example, this method is equivalent to 
comparing the difference in outcomes between the New York EZ and the surrounding city of 
New York with those of the Los Angeles EC and the surrounding city of Los Angeles, before 
and after the program.  This identification strategy implies that the relative change in outcomes 
between the Los Angeles EC and the surrounding city is what would have happened in the 
absence of the program between the New York EZ and the remainder of New York City.    
The perfect counter-factual for measuring the effect of the EZ program would be to know 
what would have happened in designated areas had the EZ never been assigned there.  Because 
the EZ must be assigned to a particular area or group of areas, this is not possible.  I use the 
                                                 
9 The runner-up group consists of parts of the following cities: Akron, OH, Albany, GA , Albany, NY, 
Albuquerque, NM, Birmingham, AL, Boston, MA, Bridgeport, CT, Buffalo, NY, Burlington, VT, Charleston, SC, 
Charlotte, NC, Cleveland, OH, Columbus, OH, Dallas, TX, Denver, CO, Des Moines, IA, East St. Louis, IL, El 
Paso, TX, Flint, MI, Harrisburg, PA, Houston, TX, Huntington, WV, Indianapolis, IA, Ironton, OH, Jackson, MS, 
Kansas City, KS, Kansas City, MO, Las Vegas, NV, Little Rock, AR, Los Angeles, CA, Louisville, KY, Lowell, 
MA, Manchester, NH, Memphis, TN, Miami, FL, Milwaukee, WI, Minneapolis, MN, Muskegon, MI, Nashville, 
TN, New Haven, CT, Newark, NJ, Newburgh, NY, Norfolk, VA, Oakland, CA, Ogden, UT, Oklahoma City, OK, 
Omaha, NE, Phoenix, AZ, Pittsburgh, PA, Portland, OR, Providence, RI, Rochester, NY, San Antonio, TX, San 
Diego, CA, San Francisco, CA, Seattle, WA, Springfield, IL, Springfield, MA, St. Louis, MO, St. Paul, MN, Tampa, 
FL, Waco, TX, Washington, DC, and Wilmington, DE. 
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“runner-up” areas to provide the best possible counter-factual for EZ assignment.  By using the 
“runner-up” areas and differencing with the larger city I can eliminate many of the concerns that 
arise when using simple before and after comparisons or comparisons with similar areas.  
Because I determine the effect of the EZ program by comparing these areas with areas that 
received some assistance, my results should be interpreted as the marginal effect of the 
assistance offered to the EZ areas (larger grants and the presence of a wage tax credit).   
The differencing design isolates the effect of the EZ from both time-invariant, area-wide 
effects and changes in economic conditions that vary over time but affect all areas.  The 
comparison group used is similar to the EZ areas but is not likely subject to negative (or positive) 
effects from the policy because they made up of tracts located in different cities than the EZs.  
Because both the comparison and treatment groups applied for EZ designation and met the 
requirements for unemployment and poverty, there will be no unobservable differences caused 
from going through the application process or being qualified. To reflect this strategy, the 
variables used in each regression are of the following form:10 
(1) Yi= (Ytract2000-Ycity2000) - (Ytract1990-Ycity1990) 
The differencing methodology can be thought of as a way to control for unobserved factors 
that could be driving correlation between the EZ and economic outcomes causing bias.  The first 
difference in this method (the first bracketed term in Equation (1)) eliminates any city-wide time 
variant variables that could be in the error term.  Taking this difference eliminates any difference 
in economic outcomes that happen because of city-specific shocks over the decade.  For 
                                                 
10 This method of differencing does not allow me to capture the coefficients on surrounding city or pre-treatment 
characteristics, which may be desirable.  In addition, it restricts the coefficients on the city change and pre-treatment 
characteristics to be equal to one.  I implement this strategy instead of using these variables as controls for three 
reasons:  first to avoid multicollinearity issues between the city and tract variables and between the city variables in 
different years, second to avoid using endogenous pre-treatment characteristics in the instrumental variables 
regression directly, and lastly for ease of interpreting the regression results as changes. 
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example, if a city had a large manufacturing facility close in the 1990s taking this difference will 
remove the effect of this event on economic outcomes, leaving the effect of the EZ only, as long 
as the event did not affect EZ areas differentially than the larger city.  
The second difference in this method (the difference between the two bracketed terms in 
Equation (1)) eliminates any tract-specific or city-wide fixed effects that could be responsible for 
changes in economic outcomes.  Taking this difference eliminates any difference in economic 
outcomes that occurs because of the fixed attributes of a census tract or city.  For example, if all 
tracts chosen for EZs have poor school systems, taking this difference will eliminate the 
possibility that the EZ variable is also picking up the effects of poor school systems on economic 
outcomes.     
The estimating equation used to determine the effect of the EZ program on the percentage of 
residents employed and the percentage of residents with income below the national poverty level 
is: 
(2) Yi = α + βEZi + X′iδ + u 
Where i indexes the census tracts, X is a vector of control variables, and EZ is a dummy 
variable for availability of the EZ wage tax credit.  All variables are differenced as shown in 
Equation (1). The unit of observation is the census tract, and I use data from the 1990 and 2000 
censuses to estimate Equation (1).   
The differencing method limits the error term to being only census tract level variables that 
change over the decade.  If there are variables that are tract-specific that change over the decade 
and are correlated with designation of the EZ they can still cause bias in the estimate of EZ 
program effects.  In the results section I describe the endogeneity problem caused by omission of 
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tract-specific variables that change over time and propose a solution using an instrumental 
variables approach.   
Another potential weakness of this differencing method is that the larger city may be subject 
to spill-overs from the EZ policy.  This problem arises when using comparison and treatment 
areas that are similar and geographically close, because economic activity can shift across these 
areas.  It is also possible that the policy creates positive (negative) externalities on comparison 
areas, making the effect of the program look smaller (larger) than it actually is.  Differencing 
with the entire city surrounding the EZ mutes the potential for spill-over effects because the 
effect of the EZ on specific census tracts is averaged in with other census tracts that are not likely 
to be changed by the presence of an EZ.  If there are positive (negative) general equilibrium 
effects for the city surrounding the EZ, then the estimates presented in Section V would be 
biased downward (upward).11  
 
IV. Summary Statistics for Treatment and Comparison Groups 
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the demographic and economic characteristics of EZ areas and 
comparison and their respective surrounding cities for the 1990 and 2000 census.  Not 
surprisingly, according to the 1990 census both EZ and runner-up area residents were 
substantially worse off economically than the residents of the cities surrounding them prior to EZ 
designation.  On average, EZ residents had about half of the per-capita income of surrounding 
city residents ($8,621 and $17,417 respectively).  By design of the program, the EZs had higher 
                                                 
11 If EZs improved other areas of the city because of a positive externality, then comparing to the EZ area to the 
surrounding city would understate the true effect.   If the EZs shifted resources away from other areas of the city, 
then comparing the EZ area to the surrounding city would overstate the true effect. 
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unemployment rates than the surrounding cities.12  On average, the unemployment rate in the 
EZs was nearly double that of the surrounding cities.  Only about a quarter (27 percent) of EZ 
residents were employed, compared to 41 percent of the surrounding cities’ residents.  
Similarly, runner-up area residents had slightly more than half of the surrounding city per 
capita income ($9,919 and $17,339), and nearly double the unemployment rate.  Employment in 
runner-up areas was, on average, 34 percent compared to 45 percent in the larger city, a smaller 
gap than the EZ areas and their respective cities. 
Economic outcomes for EZ residents improved relative to residents in the cities surrounding 
them between the 1990 to the 2000 census.  The average per capita income for residents living in 
EZ areas increased by $2,628 (real 1999 dollars) compared with $2,008 in the cities surrounding 
the EZ areas.  The average employment rate of EZ residents rose by 7.4 percent, compared to a 
2.4 percent decline in the average employment rate in larger city, thus shrinking the relative gap 
in employment for EZ residents.  
The runner-up areas did not, on average, experience the same economic improvement as the 
EZ areas relative to their respective cities.  Changes in per-capita income for the runner-up areas 
were about the same in dollar terms as the surrounding city (an increase of $1,979 and $1,804, 
respectively).  The average employment rate in runner-up cities remained constant, while the 
larger cities experienced a one percentage point decline in employment.13  
The increased economic well-being of EZ area residents relative to residents of the 
surrounding city and the runner-up areas suggests that the EZ program was successful.   
However, this comparison alone cannot determine the effect of the EZ program on residents for 
                                                 
12 The selection requirement for EZs was based on unemployment rates.  However, unemployment rates do not take 
into account those who have left the labor force as discouraged workers.  Because my analysis is on the urban poor 
who may fall into the discouraged worker category, I focus on the employment rate as a measure of how the 
program effects labor market outcomes. 
13 Summary statistics for individual runner-up areas are available from the author upon request. 
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two reasons. First, many of the demographic differences (as shown in Tables 2 and 3) between 
the EZ areas and the surrounding cities also changed over the decade, which could be related to 
the economic outcomes of residents.  For example, the gap in high school education between EZ 
residents and those in the surrounding city decreased over the decade, and there was an overall 
increase in the percent of EZ residents with a high school diploma or GED.  Second, these results 
may be driven by the selection of EZ areas as being places where improved economic outcomes 
were expected or would have happened regardless of the program. 
 
V. OLS and IV Estimation Results 
Table 4 presents the results of estimating Equation (2) using employment as the dependent 
variable.  Table 5 presents the results using resident poverty as the dependent variable.  Table 6 
presents the results using median property values as the dependent variable.  For each outcome 
of interest I estimate a specification without control variables (the first column of each Table) 
and also using the percentage of residents who are college educated, the percentage of residents 
who are a race other than white, and the percentage of the population that is of working age as 
controls (the second column of each Table).  The standard errors reported in Table 4, 5, and 6 are 
clustered at the city level to reflect the likelihood that economic outcomes for areas that are 
geographically close are highly correlated.  
The OLS results in Table 4 and 5 show that the EZ program was correlated with increasing 
employment and lowering poverty rates of residents.  The results of the regressions without 
control variables suggest that the program was correlated with a 2 percentage point rise in the 
employment rate of residents and a 2 percentage point decrease in the poverty rate of residents; 
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both results are statistically significant at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.14  The OLS 
results in Table 6 show that the EZ program was not correlated with increasing median property 
values in an economically significant or statistically significant way.  The results are not 
sensitive to the inclusion of control variables, as the EZ point estimate and standard errors 
remain almost identical to the specification that includes other characteristics of the census tract. 
Endogeneity is a concern15 in estimating Equation (2) because EZs were selected by HUD 
based, in part, on choosing applicants that showed,  
“ability to spur economic opportunity by creating jobs, attracting private 
partnerships, and training residents for new job opportunities; promote 
community development through a long-term economic development strategy; 
establish community-based partnerships; and develop a plan for responding to 
community needs by integrating economic, physical, human, and other 
strategies.” (CRS, 2002). 
 
This quote suggests that areas selected for the EZ program may have been expected to have 
positive economic outcomes even in the absence of the tax credits.  This means that EZ 
designation is likely correlated with characteristics of the application that are also correlated with 
positive economic outcomes.  If this is true, then the OLS results will be biased.16  Using a 
Hausman (1978) test for endogeneity, I find evidence that EZ designation is endogenous to 
employment, marginally endogenous poverty, but not to property value changes.17      
                                                 
14 To put these results into perspective consider that the national employment rate (or employment to population 
ratio) varied by about 3 percentage points throughout the 1990s according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(bls.gov). 
15 Theoretical models of policy determinants, for example Besley and Case (2000) and Knight (2002), echo the 
concern that most policy cannot be treated as strictly exogenous. 
16 If EZ areas were chosen because they were expected to do well even in the absence of the program this would 
suggest OLS estimates are biased toward showing a positive effect of the program.  The opposite could also be true, 
that EZ areas were chosen because they were expected to do poorly even with the zone designation or the worst 
areas were chosen because they needed the most help.  If this were the case OLS estimates would be biased toward 
showing no effect of the program. 
17 I test the null hypothesis that the predicted errors from the EZ designation regression (EZ i = α + β1(Terms)i 
β2(Member)i + X′iδ + u ) are insignificant determinants of economic outcomes in the zone.  Using an F test, I reject 
the null for changes in employment (p-value= 0.01), marginally reject the null for changes in poverty (p-value= 
0.06), and do not reject the null for changes in property values (p-value= 0.76). 
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Estimation with Endogenous EZ Designation: Instrumental Variables  
A solution to the endogenous selection of EZs is to use an instrumental variables regression.  
This requires an instrument for EZ designation, or something about the census tract that is 
correlated with being designated as an EZ and uncorrelated with unobserved variables.  A 
plausible instrument for EZ designation is one that reflects the political influence of the Federal 
Representative associated with the census tract.  Knight (2002) uses several politically related 
variables as instruments, including committee assignment of Federal Representatives, for federal 
grant spending to determine crowd out effects on state and local spending.  Other studies, 
including Poterba (1994), Levitt (1997), and Kubik and Moran (2003) use the exogenous cycle 
of elections to explain politically motivated action.   
To understand the relevance of political influence in designating EZs it helps to understand 
the process by which the bill containing EZs became law.  EZs were part of a Budget 
Reconciliation Bill, which contained many budget items including: funding for agencies, 
extensions for existing projects, and new spending.  The final version of the bill passed in 1993 
by a margin of one vote, with the vice-president casting the deciding vote (Libschutz, 1995).  
The close margin suggests that influential members of Congress could have used leverage to 
obtain funding for their districts to guarantee voting in favor of the bill.  One potential use of this 
leverage would have been to secure future EZ designation for part of their districts.  If influential 
members bargained for EZs in this way, we would expect that EZ designation would be 
correlated with measures of congressional power.   
There is existing evidence of the relationship between political favoritism and EZ 
designation.  Wallace (2004) finds that a location represented by a member serving on the House 
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Ways and Means committee is correlated with being designated an EZ.  He finds that no other 
committee membership is a significant determinant after controlling for other area 
characteristics.  As an example of the correlation between Ways and Means membership and EZ 
designation, Figure 2 highlights the overlap between the New York City EZ and the 
Congressional district of Ways and Means member Charles Rangel.  As shown by the map, a 
large portion of the New York City EZ is inside of Representative Rangel’s district.18 
Table 7 shows the first stage of the instrumental variable regression using both Ways and 
Means membership and the number of years a member was on the committee at the time of 
designation as instruments for EZ designation.19  Column 1 shows results without clustering 
standard errors and Column 2 corrects for general heteroskedasticity using the White correction, 
both results show the same strong correlation.  The F-statistic for columns 1 and 2 shows that the 
instruments are jointly significant with a P-value of essentially zero.20   
The first stage results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 could be questionable if the error term is 
spatially correlated.  This is a problem if there were things other than observables (including the 
instruments) that adjacent census tracts have in common that drove EZ selection.  While it is 
clear that the instruments are spatially correlated, it seems less likely that there are unobservable 
variables in the selection process that are correlated across adjacent census tracts.  This also 
seems less likely given that I use only tracts that applied and qualified for EZ status in my 
                                                 
18 I identified Ways and Means members for the 103rd Congress from a list of historic committee assignments 
available through http://clerk.house.gov/ and matched the corresponding census tracts using the Mable/Geocorr 
database online at: http://mcdc2.missouri.edu/websas/geocorr90.shtml. 
19 In results not shown the first stage results for using only the Ways and Means member dummy variable are also 
significant, but not as strong.  First stage results using only the number of terms a member was on the committee at 
time of designation are also significant and quite strong. 
20 I test the over-identification restriction using the Sargon-Hansen J-statistic (through the ivreg2 command in Stata 
(Baum, et. al., 2007)).  This test fails to reject the null hypothesis that instruments are valid, with a p-value of 
0.1916. 
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sample, so that any concerns that errors are spatially correlated because observations in an 
undesirable part of the city are minimized.   
Although the point estimates in the first stage regressions are the same in all cases, the 
standard errors on the coefficient of interest when grouped by geography are large relative to the 
point estimate.  As shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 the first stage results are not robust to 
clustering the standard errors across geographic location, as p-values for the instruments are in 
the .35-.37 range.  The large standard errors are likely due to the fact that most zones or proposed 
zones are split among multiple congressional districts, so that the instrument only covers part of 
the census tracts that received the designation.  It is worth mentioning that the point estimates in 
the first stage, not the standard errors, determine second stage results.21     
The second stage IV results sharply contrast the OLS results.  Point estimates for the IV 
specifications using each instrument separately (the third and fourth columns of Table 4 and 5) 
show that the EZ had a negative effect on employment and increased resident poverty.  I take the 
point estimates for these specifications to be evidence that the OLS estimates are biased toward 
finding a positive effect on employment and a negative effect on resident poverty.  The standard 
errors associated with these specifications are, however, so large that it is impossible to say 
anything precise about the results of the specifications using each instrument separately. 
Point estimates using both instruments are shown in column (5) of Table 4 and 5.  The IV 
results using both instruments simultaneously suggest that the program had zero economic effect 
on employment and increased the poverty rate of zone residents by 2 percentage points.  The 
standard errors for this specification, although smaller than the specification using each 
                                                 
21 All first stage regressions are reported using a linear probability model.  The sign and significance of instruments 
for all first stage results in columns 1 and 2 are robust to using a Probit or Logit model.  For the joint significance 
test for both instruments the value of chi-squared test statistic in each model is over 44, with a p-value of 0.00.  As 
with the linear probability model, both the Probit and Logit model are sensitive to the assumption about spatial 
correlation of the error term in the first stage.  
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instrument separately, are also too large to attach statistical significance to these results.22  The 
larger standard errors for the IV compared to OLS results are not surprising as they are subject to 
an additional variance caused by small variation in the predicted value for the EZ variable, see 
Wooldridge (2002) for an excellent description of this problem.  The variation in the predicted 
value for EZ is particularly small in this case as it must take on a value between zero and one.  
IV regression results presented in column (5) of Table 6 suggest that tax credits are 
capitalized into local property values (as measured by the median property value at the census 
tract level).23   All OLS and IV specifications show that the EZ program increased the median 
property value.  Only the results from the IV regression using both instruments, presented in 
column 5 of Table 6, are statistically significant (at the five percent level).24  The results shown 
in Tables 4-7 are not sensitive to including additional control variables such as the change in 
housing vacancy rate, occupancy rate, resident per-capita income, percent of residents with 
graduate degrees, or percent of Hispanic residents.  These results are available from the author 
upon request. 
Results in column (5) suggest that the EZ program increased property values by over 
$100,000 (nominal).25  A $100,000 property value increase is roughly equivalent to the present 
value of claiming the full wage tax credit on five employees for nine years.26  The IV results lend 
                                                 
22 Using a t-test I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the IV coefficient of interest is equal to the corresponding 
OLS coefficient for both employment and poverty. 
23 The census data on property values is from a self-report survey where respondents are asked to report the value 
that their property would sell for including vacant properties.  Unfortunately, this does not include any measure of 
commercial property values. 
24 The difference in statistical significance between the OLS and IV results comes from the increased point estimate 
values (caused by removing the bias from OLS estimates).  When the increased point estimates on the property 
values coefficients are statistically significant, the removal of bias more than compensates for the increased standard 
errors that commonly plague IV results (as explained for the employment and poverty results).  
25 The nominal increase in median property value for the United States between the 1990 and 2000 censuses was 
about $40,000. 
26 This present value calculation assumes a 5 percent annual discount rate, with the full tax credit claimed for each 
employee, and an immediate increase in property value.  Note that the original EZ were designated for 10 years. 
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themselves to a simple, intuitive explanation of what happens as a result of zone designation.  
The subsidy must be entirely realized by employers in the labor market, so that employment and 
incomes (poverty) do not change.  The labor market incidence of the EZ program may be caused, 
in part, by the lack of a tenure requirement for the wage tax credit, so that firms do not have to 
expand employment to realize substantial benefits.  Employers, however, are subject to the 
additional location restriction, thus demand for land within the EZ should shift to the right, 
causing an increase in property values and capitalization of the subsidy.   
 
Weighing OLS and IV Results 
The IV results suggest that the OLS specifications over-estimate the effect of the EZ program 
on increasing resident employment and decreasing poverty, the effect of the program is smaller 
and quite uncertain as shown by the large standard errors.  This differs from the OLS 
interpretation that the tax incentives increased employment and reduced poverty in statistically 
and economically significant ways.  However, because the IV results are imprecisely estimated, 
and because the wage tax credit is unambiguously beneficial for both workers and employers in 
the EZs, these regressions should be viewed primarily as casting doubt on the magnitude and 
significance of the OLS results (rather than as evidence that the EZs have negative effects on 
communities as some of the point estimates show).   
The value of the IV regressions is that they take the zone designation process into account, 
and show that the OLS estimates may be biased toward finding a positive effect of the program.  
The OLS results show the combined effect of the EZ program and the assignment/designation 
bias.  The IV results remove the assignment bias from the estimation and are closer to being a 
purely causal effect of the program.  The difference between the OLS and IV results suggests 
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that the assignment bias is positive and substantial for employment changes and negative and 
substantial for poverty changes.  Although there is some suggestive evidence (the quote in 
section V, for example) that the assignment bias comes from HUD picking strong applicants, 
some of this bias could also occur at the local level.  For example, if places that would have had 
success in the absence of the EZ program created stronger applications and thus were more likely 
to be chosen.          
Murray (2006) suggests a method of comparison to help determine if the IV results will be 
less biased than the OLS when dealing with an endogenous regressor.  He suggests that the 
relative bias of the estimates (IV/OLS) will be equal to the number of instruments divided by the 
product of the number of observations and the first stage R-squared.  This comparison method 
suggests that for each instrument and for the case where I use both instruments simultaneously, 
the IV results are less biased than the OLS.  Although this test cannot determine that the IV 
results are not biased, it does suggest that they are less biased than the OLS. 
One concern for bias in the second stage IV regressions is that representatives on the Ways 
and Means Committee get more earmarked spending (other than the EZ) for their districts than 
other representatives in my sample.  Notice that if the concern is that earmark spending increases 
employment and reduces poverty, then the instrument would be positively correlated with the 
dependent variable and the IV regressions would be biased toward finding that the EZ program 
reduced poverty and increased employment.  The opposite could also be true; earmark spending 
is correlated with decreasing employment and reducing poverty, in which case the instrument 
would be negatively correlated with the dependent variable and the IV regressions would be 
biased toward finding that the EZ program increased poverty and reduced employment. 
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  As shown in figure 3, at first glance it seems to be the case that the instruments are 
positively correlated with other spending, as federal spending27 for districts in my sample grew 
substantially more on average for Ways and Means committee members than non-members.  
Upon further inspection, however, the difference in spending between Ways and Means member 
districts and other members in my sample is almost entirely driven by a single district (district 22 
in Florida).  Spending in Florida district 22 increased by more than $50 billion dollars between 
1993 and 1997 before dropping back to normal levels in 1998.  This district represents one 
census tract in my sample, and restricting it from the sample does not change the primary results 
of the IV regressions.28   
Figure 3 also shows the spending path for Ways and Means member districts if Florida 
district 22 were to have grown at the same rate as the other districts in the sample, which is a 
more accurate representation of how spending changed in these districts.  Although figure 3 does 
show that spending is still on average higher in Ways and Means member districts throughout 
the 1990s, the difference remains relatively constant over time, and therefore less likely to bias 
the IV results as the dependent variable is the change in economic outcomes of zone residents 
over the decade. 
 In addition, for Ways and Means membership to influence economic outcomes directly the 
member would have to remain on the committee beyond the designation period, which appears 
in most cases not to be true.  There is substantial variation in how many terms Representatives 
                                                 
27 Federal Spending data are from the annual Consolidated Federal Funds Reports, they represent the sum of all 
direct payments to individuals (including retirement and disability benefits), grants (block, formula, project, and 
cooperative), procurement contracts, federal employee wages and salaries, direct loans, guaranteed loans, insured 
loans, insurance, and direct payments not made to individuals.  This data is available at the county level and I 
allocate it to the congressional district using the Mable/Geocorr database according to population weights.     
28 I cannot control for spending directly in my regressions as the data are not available at the census tract level of 
geography.  The county level data can be allocated based on population to the census tract and city level, but this 
would simply be equal to the census tract share of population divided by the city population.   
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were on the committee before and after the 103rd congress.  Some members were in their final 
year (Dan Rostenkowski, D-IL), others were in their first and only year (Rick Santorum, R-PA), 
and others have been on the committee ever since (Chuck Rangel, D-NY).  Of the 39 members, 
the Ways and Means committee featured 12 new members for the 104th Congress, which began 
by the time the EZ tax incentives started.  By the year 2000, the 106th Congress (the end of the 
data for this paper) only 21 of the 39 Ways and Means members from the 103rd Congress 
remained.  
Some of the Ways and Means members whose districts received an EZ were members of the 
committee for the entire decade, and all were prominent Democrats: Charles Rangel (D-NY), 
Benjamin Cardin (D-MD), and John Lewis (D-GA).  In terms of the instrument this may be a 
concern if these members were more likely to have the ability to alter the economic status of 
residents in their district.  If this is the case, then the instrument would be correlated with future 
economic status of residents as well as EZ designation and would not be exogenous.  However, 
due to the Republican take-over in the 104th Congress the Democrats lost the committee chair 
and majority.  This means democratic members who were influential in the 103rd congress (when 
they were the majority party) lost influence in future years.      
 
VI. Conclusion 
Geographically-targeted tax incentives are a growing part of the federal agenda used to 
address declining industrial cities and redevelop areas struck by economic hardship.  Part of the 
promise of these tax incentives is that they will restore or increase employment for local 
residents and reduce poverty.  The evidence presented here suggests that the EZ wage tax credit 
and may not live up to that promise, but that the program does increase property values.  
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Although instrumental variables estimates cannot rule out the OLS results that suggest a large 
effect of the program, they do suggest that the OLS findings are biased toward finding a positive 
effect of the program.  The IV results presented here contrast to the OLS results and the preferred 
estimates of Busso and Kline (2006) and HUD (2001), which find the federal EZ program is 
correlated with an economic and statistically significant improvement in the resident 
employment rate and a reduction in the poverty rate of residents.   
The IV results presented here are in agreement with the substantial property value increase 
found by Krupka and Noonan (2009), despite differences in the choice of comparison group and 
estimation strategy.  The similar results found here and in Krupka and Noonan are encouraging 
as they reveal that the property value increase is robust across multiple comparison groups and 
specifications.  Krupka and Noonan find these effects even in the OLS specifications (comparing 
with future EZ areas) without accounting for endogeneity, while I only find a substantial 
difference between EZ and “runner-up” areas using the IV estimation.  The difference in OLS 
findings highlight both the importance of choosing a control group and accounting for 
endogeneity and suggest that indeed there may be some positive benefit to areas that underwent 
the initial application process.         
The null results for resident employment and poverty do not suggest that these types of tax 
incentives and grants are not useful in improving economic conditions of residents, as evidenced 
by the large positive effect on property values.  It is also possible that the EZs have brought 
better jobs, or jobs with fewer hours to residents or those residents are benefiting in other ways 
from new skills learned at these jobs.  More research is necessary to determine the exact effect 
these tax policies have in the labor market.  However, given the relationship between EZs and 
property values shown here, it may be more likely that geographically targeted tax incentives and 
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grants benefit land owners, therefore caution should be used when crafting policy that is tied to 
location if the intended effect is to improve labor market outcomes for residents. 
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New York City EZ Los Angeles EC
Figure 1:  Triple Difference Identification Strategy
I compare the difference between the New York EZ and New York City before and after 
zone designation with the difference between the Los Angeles EC and Los Angeles 
before and after designation.
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2: New York City EZ (Black) and Charles Rangel Congressional District 
(Hatched Area)
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Annual Federal Government Spending For Congressional Districts in 
Sample:1993-2000
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Source:  Annual Consolidated Federal Funds Reports Spending Data matched to Congressional District using population weights from Geocorr 
Database online at  http://mcdc2.missouri.edu/websas/geocorr90.shtml
1993 1997 2000
2
4
6
8
10
12
Ways and Means 
Member Average
Other Committee Average
Ways and Means 
Member Average, minus 
FL district 22 growth
 
  
 
 
Table 1: Benefits of Zone Designation 
  
Wage 
Credit 
SS Block 
Grants 
Cap Gains 
Exclusion 
Stock Sale 
Exclusion 
Facility 
Bonds 
179 
Expensing 
Round I EZ Yes $100 million Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Round I EC 
and EEC3 No $3 million No No Yes No 
Round I 
SEZ No
2 
$450 million for 
L.A, $177 
million for CLE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Round II EZ Yes1 none Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Round III 
EZ Yes
1 none Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1. Available since 2002 
2. Available starting in 2000 
3. Enhanced EC differ from EC because they received some HUD grants and loan guarantees 
 
Source:  Tax Incentive Guide for Business (HUD 2001) 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 2: 1990 Empowerment Zone and Surrounding City Summary Statistics 
  Atlanta, GA Baltimore, MD Chicago, IL Detroit, MI New York, NY Philadelphia, PA* Runner-Up Average 
  
1990 
EZ 
1990 
City 
1990 
EZ 
1990 
City 
1990 
EZ 
1990 
City 
1990 
EZ 
1990 
City 
1990 
EZ 
1990 
City 
1990 
EZ 
1990 
City 
1990 
Zone 
1990 
City 
Land Area 
(sq.mi.) 10 132 6 81 16 227 25 139 7 303 3 135 11 132 
Population 54514 394017 77173 736014 224737 2783726 112531 1027974 221178 7322564 44541 1585577 61835 400592 
Population 
Density 5561 2985 12829 9087 13972 12263 4547 7395 31927 24167 16167 11745 7200 4537 
                              
% White 5% 31% 21% 39% 12% 45% 26% 22% 15% 52% 12% 54% 36% 65% 
% Black 92% 67% 77% 59% 71% 39% 66% 76% 57% 29% 61% 40% 51% 27% 
% Other 2% 2% 1% 2% 17% 15% 8% 3% 27% 19% 27% 7% 13% 8% 
                              
% Under 
20 40% 30% 34% 29% 42% 31% 31% 34% 34% 27% 38% 29% 36% 30% 
% 21 to 29 15% 17% 17% 16% 15% 17% 14% 14% 16% 16% 14% 16% 16% 17% 
% 30 to 39 15% 18% 16% 17% 14% 17% 16% 16% 15% 17% 14% 16% 15% 17% 
%40 to 49 9% 12% 10% 12% 9% 11% 10% 11% 11% 13% 10% 11% 10% 11% 
% 50 to 64 10% 11% 11% 13% 11% 13% 13% 12% 13% 14% 11% 14% 11% 12% 
% 65 and 
over 11% 11% 12% 14% 10% 12% 16% 12% 10% 13% 12% 15% 12% 13% 
* The Philadelphia EZ also includes parts of Camden, NJ which are excluded from this analysis 
 
  
 
 
Table 2 (Continued): 1990 Empowerment Zone and Surrounding City Summary Statistics 
  Atlanta, GA Baltimore, MD Chicago, IL Detroit, MI New York, NY Philadelphia, PA* Runner-Up Average 
  
1990 
EZ 
1990 
City 
1990 
EZ 
1990 
City 
1990 
EZ 1990 City 
1990 
EZ 
1990 
City 
1990 
EZ 1990 City 
1990 
EZ 
1990 
City 
1990 
Zone 
1990 
City 
Unemployment 
Rate 18% 9% 15% 9% 24% 11% 28% 20% 17% 9% 24% 10% 16% 9% 
Employment 
Rate 28% 44% 32% 43% 25% 43% 24% 33% 31% 44% 24% 41% 34% 45% 
Labor Force 
Participation 
34% 49% 37% 47% 33% 49% 33% 41% 37% 49% 31% 46% 40% 49% 
Income per 
Capita (1999 
dollars) 
$7,057 $20,474 $10,426 $16,072 $7,527 $17,285 $9,333 $12,654 $9,938 $21,817 $7,446 $16,202 $9,819 $17,339 
Income below 
poverty line 
56.39% 27.29% 42.48% 21.87% 48.57% 21.62% 47.45% 32.41% 42.58% 19.29% 53.30% 20.27% 40.17% 19.95% 
                              
Total Housing 
Units 24,717 182,754 32,934 303,706 89,091 1,133,039 55,127 410,027 87,867 2,992,169 18,836 674,899 23,862 170,606 
Vacant 
Housing Units 
21% 15% 18% 9% 20% 10% 18% 9% 8% 6% 21% 11% 14% 9% 
                              
% Graduating 
from High 
school 
41% 70% 43% 61% 42% 66% 46% 62% 45% 68% 39% 64% 52% 72% 
% Graduating 
from College 
5% 27% 8% 15% 7% 19% 8% 10% 9% 23% 5% 15% 10% 21% 
* The Philadelphia EZ also includes parts of Camden, NJ which are excluded from this analysis 
 
  
 
 
Table 3: 2000 Empowerment Zone and Surrounding City Summary Statistics 
  Atlanta, GA Baltimore, MD Chicago, IL Detroit, MI New York, NY Philadelphia, PA* Runner-Up Average 
  
2000 
EZ 
2000 
City 
2000 
EZ 
2000 
City 
2000 
EZ 
2000 
City 
2000 
EZ 
2000 
City 
2000 
EZ 
2000 
City 
2000 
EZ 
2000 
City 
2000 
Zone 
2000 
City 
Land Area 
(sq.mi.) 10 132 6 81 16 227 25 139 7 303 3 135 11 132 
Population 47350 416629 52496 651154 199801 2895964 99454 951270 230082 8008278 37389 1517550 47037 436522 
Population 
Density 4830 3156 8727 8039 12421 12758 4018 6844 33212 26430 13571 11241 5325 4650 
                              
% White 8% 33% 17% 32% 15% 42% 22% 12% 16% 45% 14% 45% 33% 58% 
% Black 89% 61% 79% 64% 67% 37% 63% 81% 48% 26% 59% 43% 47% 28% 
% Other 3% 5% 4% 4% 18% 21% 16% 6% 36% 29% 28% 12% 19% 14% 
                              
% Under 
20 48% 28% 40% 30% 48% 31% 41% 35% 38% 28% 42% 30% 41% 30% 
% 21 to 29 16% 18% 12% 13% 14% 16% 14% 13% 14% 14% 11% 14% 15% 15% 
% 30 to 39 14% 18% 16% 15% 14% 17% 15% 14% 16% 17% 13% 15% 15% 16% 
%40 to 49 12% 14% 15% 15% 12% 14% 14% 14% 14% 15% 14% 14% 13% 14% 
% 50 to 64 13% 13% 15% 14% 14% 13% 16% 13% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 13% 
% 65 and 
over 9% 10% 11% 13% 9% 10% 12% 10% 9% 12% 12% 14% 10% 12% 
* The Philadelphia EZ also includes parts of Camden, NJ which are excluded from this analysis 
 
  
 
 
Table 3 (Continued): 2000 Empowerment Zone and Surrounding City Summary Statistics 
  Atlanta, GA Baltimore, MD Chicago, IL Detroit, MI New York, NY Philadelphia, PA* Runner-Up Average 
  
2000 
EZ 
2000 
City 
2000 
EZ 
2000 
City 
2000 
EZ 2000 City 
2000 
EZ 
2000 
City 
2000 
EZ 2000 City 
2000 
EZ 
2000 
City 
2000 
Zone 
2000 
City 
Unemployment 
Rate 25% 14% 17% 11% 19% 10% 18% 14% 19% 10% 20% 11% 15% 8% 
Employment 
Rate 30% 44% 31% 39% 29% 42% 32% 35% 30% 41% 24% 39% 34% 44% 
Labor Force 
Participation 
40% 51% 37% 44% 36% 47% 39% 40% 37% 45% 30% 43% 40% 49% 
Income per 
Capita (1999 
dollars) 
$9,105 $25,772 $13,064 $16,978 $10,896 $20,175 $12,766 $14,717 $12,268 $22,402 $9,400 $16,509 $11,798 $19,143 
Income below 
poverty line 
46.45% 24.40% 37.20% 22.92% 38.24% 19.61% 36.71% 26.08% 38.51% 21.25% 43.99% 22.89% 35.14% 19.45% 
                              
Total Housing 
Units 20,203 186,998 27,895 300,477 79,368 1,152,871 44,145 375,096 94,320 3,200,912 17,068 661,958 18,724 181,570 
Vacant 
Housing Units 
15% 10% 27% 14% 18% 8% 17% 10% 11% 6% 25% 11% 13% 8% 
                              
% Graduating 
from High 
school 
57% 77% 57% 68% 55% 72% 58% 70% 55% 72% 51% 71% 61% 77% 
% Graduating 
from College 
11% 35% 13% 19% 10% 25% 9% 11% 11% 27% 7% 18% 11% 24% 
* The Philadelphia EZ also includes parts of Camden, NJ which are excluded from this analysis 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 4:  Effect of Empowerment Zone Tax Incentives on Zone Resident 
Employment (standard errors clustered at the city level are shown in 
parenthesis) 
  OLS IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      Terms Membership Both 
EZ 0.02*** 0.02** -0.03 -0.09 0.00 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.25) (0.02) 
% College Educated   0.28*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 
    (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
% Working Age   0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
% Non-White   -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14*** 
    (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
           
N 1262 1262 1262 1262 1262 
R2 0.02 0.21       
*** indicates significant at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level 
Data are from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses 
Unit of observation is the census tract 
 
 
 
Table 5:  Effect of Empowerment Zone Tax Incentives on Zone Resident Poverty 
(standard errors clustered at the city level are shown in parenthesis) 
  OLS IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      Terms Membership Both 
EZ -0.02** -0.02* 0.04 0.07 0.02 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.20) (0.03) 
% College Educated   -0.22** -0.22** -0.23** -0.22** 
    (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.01) 
% Working Age   -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
    (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
% Non-White   0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
    (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
           
N 1258 1258 1258 1258 1258 
R2 0 0.04       
*** indicates significant at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level 
Data are from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses 
Unit of observation is the census tract 
 
  
 
 
Table 6:  Effect of Empowerment Zone Tax Incentives on Median Property Value 
(standard errors clustered at the city level are shown in parenthesis) 
  OLS IV 
  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
     Terms Membership Both 
EZ 4885 6632 116681 140094 105305** 
  (8788) (9477) (83719) (226011) (44928) 
% College Educated  206392*** 200946*** 199787** 201509*** 
   (57366) (75155) (78520) (73533) 
% Working Age  -243 -1554 -1833 -1418 
   (3274) (5460) (6613) (5100) 
% Non-White  -7969 -5417 -4874 -5681 
   (19132) (33080) (37493) (31072) 
         
N 1262 1262 1262 1262 1262 
R2 0.00 0.05     
*** indicates significant at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level 
Data are from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses, property values are expressed in nominal 
changes, per-capita income is expressed in 1999 dollars 
Unit of observation is the census tract 
 
Table 7: First Stage Regression, Dependent Variable Empowerment Zone Designation 
(standard errors in parenthesis) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
No 
cluster 
Robust 
SE 
Cluster at 
City 
Cluster at 
District 
Democratic Terms on Committee 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04 0.04 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) 
Ways & Means Member -0.27*** -0.27*** -0.27 -0.27 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.26) (0.25) 
% College Educated 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
  (0.16) (0.16) (0.27) (0.25) 
% of Population Working Age 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
% of Population Non-White 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
  (0.09) (0.10) (0.21) (0.16) 
Constant 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.07) 
N 1262 1262 1262 1262 
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Instrument F-test (2,1256) 28.02 31.19    
Instrument F-test (2, 66)   1.06   
Instrument F-test (2, 98)    1 
P-Value 0 0 0.35 0.37 
*** indicates significant at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level  
Source: Authors calculations using 1990 and 2000 Census data 
Note: Unit of observation is the census tract 
     
Appendix:  Empowerment Zone Program Benefits 
 
179 Expensing:  Businesses operating within the EZ are allowed to immediately expense a 
larger amount of the purchase of qualified property than non-EZ businesses.  The 179 expensing 
limit for non-EZ businesses is $102,000, EZ businesses are allowed to expense up to $137,000 
(limits are in 2004 dollars, but are adjusted annually for inflation).  The regular 179 expensing 
provision does not allow for the expensing of building purchases; however buildings purchased 
in an EZ may be expensed (IRS, 2004).  EZ businesses are also allowed to claim deductions for 
Brownfield clean up and certain commercial revitalization projects that they may otherwise not 
qualify for. 
 
Capital Gains Exclusion:  Businesses operating in an EZ are allowed to postpone the reporting 
of gains from the sale of qualified assets.  These assets must have been purchased at least one 
year prior to sale and used mostly for business purposes within the EZ (IRS, 2004). 
 
Stock Sale Exclusion:  Taxpayers may exclude 60 percent of the gains from the sale of small 
business stock held in EZ businesses for up to five years (50 percent is what is typically 
allowed).  The businesses must be qualified EZ businesses for most of the time that the taxpayer 
owns the stock (IRS, 2004).  
 
Facility Bonds:  State and local governments are allowed to issue tax exempt bonds if the 
proceeds are used to provide EZ businesses with qualified property9 (IRS, 2004).  The Federal 
Government puts a ceiling on the maximum amount of tax exempt bonds that may be issued by 
state and local governments in each state.  This maximum is currently set at $80 per state 
     
resident.  Bonds issued on behalf of EZ businesses were originally subject to this cap, however, 
this restriction was lifted in 1999 (GAO, 2004). 
 
EZ Wage Credit: An employer operating in the EZ can claim a tax credit for wages paid to an 
employee who resides within EZ boundaries.  The amount of the credit is 20 percent of the first 
$15,000 in wages paid, for a maximum credit of $3,000 per employee.  HUD maintains an 
address locator where employers can input an employee’s address to find out if they are 
qualified.  Qualified employees must live in designated census tracts and perform most of their 
work within the EZ.  Employers operating outside of an EZ that hire youth (persons age 18 to 24, 
inclusive) who live in EZ can also claim the Work Opportunity Tax Credit for wages paid during 
the first two years of employment.  The EZ wage credit can only be claimed for an employee if 
the employee has worked at least 90 days; there is, however, no upper bound on the tenure of an 
employee.  The following types of establishments are not permitted to claim the EZ wage credit: 
private or commercial golf courses, country clubs, massage parlors, hot tub facilities, suntan 
facilities, racetracks or other facilities used for gambling, and liquor stores.  Restrictions are also 
put on farm employees based on the assets of the farm.  In addition, an employer cannot claim 
the credit for most relatives or for individuals who own more than 5 percent of the business (IRS, 
2004). 
 
